

## Message Text

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R 221830 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8161

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MBFR CAPITALS 281

USNMR SHAPE

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FROM US REP MBFR

E. O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR: MARCH 22 MEETING WITH USSR AND HUNGARIAN REPS ON  
HUNGARIAN ISSUE

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 22,  
NETHERLANDS AND US REPS MET WITH HUNGARIAN AND USSR  
REPS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE.  
THE SESSION WAS RATHER UNPRODUCTIVE, WITH EACH SIDE  
MAINTAINING ITS POSITIONS ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE.  
EASTERN REPS CLAIMED THAT ALLIED REPS WERE MOVING  
BACKWARD, NOT FORWARD. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV REPEATEDLY  
RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN UNILATERAL STATE-  
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MENT, ALTHOUGH IN RESTRICTIVE TERMS. HE ALSO ONCE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF A HUNGARIAN UNILATERAL STATEMENT. ALLIED REPS SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS FOCUS PRIMARILY ON THE LOCATION IN THE TEXT AND PURPOSE OF SUCH STATEMENTS AND THEN ON CONTENT BUT EASTERN REPS DID NOT RESPOND. HUNGARIAN REP USTOR AGAIN PRESSED FOR ACCEPTANCE OF HIS FORMULA ON ENLARGEMENT, CLAIMING THIS WAS A LOGICAL AND USEFUL WAY TO KEEP THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE IN ABEYANCE. NETHERLANDS REP STRESSED ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS IN CONNECTION WITH HUNGARY. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS SESSION, SOVIET REPS SAID THERE SHOULD BE A FURTHER MEETING BUT WISHED TO KEEP THE DATE OPEN UNTIL SOME TIME NEXT WEEK, TENTATIVELY MARCH 27, PERHAPS AN INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. THE MARCH 22 SESSION OF TALKS ON THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE BETWEEN NETHERLANDS AND US REPS AND SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN REPS TOOK PLACE AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY. THE NETHERLANDS REP LED OFF. HE SAID THE LAST MEETING WAS, HE THOUGHT, A USEFUL ONE. WE SHOULD DO OUR BEST ON THE PRESENT OCCASION TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS IN FINDING A REALLY NEUTRAL CONCEPT FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY. AS MR. KHLESTOV HAD SAID, SUCH A FORMULA MUST BE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWO POLES. THESE ARE HUNGARY IN OR HUNGARY OUT. THE ADDITION OF ITALY CAN, THEREFORE, NOT BE CONSIDERED AS ANY SORT OF CONCESSION FROM THE EASTERN SIDE. THIS LINKING OF HUNGARY WITH ITALY ONLY DISPLACES THE PROBLEM AND GIVES IT A WIDER DIMENSION. IT IS NOT IN ANY SENSE A CONTRIBUTION TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM, AND IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE EXCLUDED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION. THE PROBLEM IS HUNGARY, AND FOR THAT PROBLEM WE SHALL HAVE TO FIND A SOLUTION. THE WEST HAD ALREADY MADE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS. AS IT DID NOT APPEAR PROBABLE THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE REACHED NOW WHICH WOULD ADEQUATELY TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES, THE ALLIES HAD THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION BE LEFT OPEN WITH THE PRACTICAL EFFECT THAT THE POSITION OF HUNGARY AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS JOINING THE CATEGORY OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND OF PARTICIPATING IN DECISIONS AND AGREED MEASURES BE KEPT OPEN.

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3. IN THE LAST SESSION, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE NOW LOOKING FOR CONCEPTS WHICH WOULD RESOLVE THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE, THAT WE SHOULD LEAVE THE PAST HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THIS ISSUE ASIDE AS HAVING BEEN ADEQUATELY STATED BY BOTH SIDES AND MOVE AHEAD TO FIND A SOLUTION IN SPECIFIC TERMS. THE ALLIED REPS AGREED WITH THIS. WE CANNOT KEEP GOING OVER THE SAME GROUND. THERE MUST BE A RESOLUTION.

4. THE ALLIES FELT THAT THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN A WAY WHICH WOULD KEEP OPEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXAMING AND DECIDING THE PARTICIPATION IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER OF HUNGARY AT A LATER STAGE, A SOLUTION WHICH IS GENUINELY NEUTRAL AND ONE WHICH DOES NOT SIMPLY ACCEPT IN TOTAL THE POSITION OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. IN THE LAST DISCUSSION ALLIED REPS MADE CLEAR THAT, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THIS PROBLEM, THERE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE SOME SPECIFIC MENTION OF HUNGARY  
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GROUP OR THE SECOND GROUP. TO PUT IT IN THE SECOND GROUP WOULD, AS ALLIES HAD POINTED OUT, MEAN RESOLVING THE ISSUE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS.

7. ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT ON THE LAST OCCASION THAT WE SHOULD PERHAPS CONSIDER A WAY OF PUTTING HUNGARY IN NEITHER GROUP, WHICH COULD PERHAPS BE DONE THROUGH INSERTING A SEPARATE PARAGRAPH ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE PROCEDURES PAPER. IN THIS SENSE, ONE COULD FOR THE TIME BEING LEAVE IN SUSPENSION THIS QUESTION AND EXAMINE INSTEAD WHAT KIND OF STATEMENTS COULD BE MADE ABOUT THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION.

8. THE ALLIES CONSIDERED THAT AN AGREED STATEMENT WOULD BE MORE NORMAL IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND WOULD BE WILLING TO TRY TO WORK ON ONE ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROPOSALS WE MADE TO THE EAST ON MARCH 13. THE POSSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS HAD ALSO COME UP IN RECENT SESSIONS. THIS POSSIBILITY TOO COULD BE EXAM-  
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INED. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE COMPLEMENTARY UNILATERAL STATEMENTS, ONE BY THE EASTERN SIDE OR BY HUNGARY, AND ONE BY THE WESTERN SIDE, COMMENTING ON THE PARAGRAPH WHICH GIVES THE LIST OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND ON THE STATUS OF HUNGARY WITH REGARD TO THAT LIST. IF THERE CANNOT BE A SINGLE AGREED STATEMENT, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE ONE BY EACH SIDE WHICH ARE INTER-RELATED.

9. WITH REGARD TO THE EASTERN MENTION OF THE LISTING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN THE PAPER OF FEB. 8, ALLIED REPS WOULD MERELY WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE LISTING CORRESPONDED CORRESPONDS TO THE PRACTICE FOLLOWED IN HILSINKI AND IN THE UN.

10. SINCE ALLIED REPS FEEL THERE WAS A GENUINE WILL TO REACH A COMPROMISE ON THIS HUNGARIAN MATTER, THEY BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND SOME SOLUTION ALONG THE LINES MENTIONED.

11. HUNGARIAN REP USTOR WAS THE FIRST TO REPLY. HE FULLY AGREED THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF SOLUTION GIVEN A WILL ON BOTH SIDES TO REACH A COMPROMISE IN THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY. HE BELIEVED HIS REMARKS DURING THE LAST MEETING HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT MISCONCEIVED AS THEY HAD BEEN SUMMARIZED BY THE NETHERLANDS REP. HE SAID THAT IF HUNGARY WERE NOT IN THE GROUP OF 11, THEN IT OBVIOUSLY BELONGED TO THE GROUP OF 8. HE MAY HAVE SAID ON THAT OCCASION THAT THERE REMAINED THE QUESTION OF DRAFTING AND THAT SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO VEIL THIS IF WESTERN EYES COULD NOT TOLERATE THE SIGHT OF HUNGARY IN THE GROUP OF 8, BUT THE FACT WAS THAT IF HUNGARY WAS NOT IN, IT WAS OUT. WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT ABEYANCE WAS WITH REGARD TO HIS FORMULA ON POSSIBLE ENLARGEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 11. HE HAD MADE THE POINT THAT, THROUGH THE USE OF SUCH A FORMULA, THE WESTERN POWERS COULD ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL OF LEAVING HUNGARY IN ABEYANCE. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NETHERLANDS REP'S PRESENT REMARKS INDICATED THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES WERE NOW NEARER THAN THEY HAD BEEN ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION.

12. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV SAID ONE MIGHT BEGIN BY ASKING THE NETHERLANDS REP, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS REMARKS ON POSSIBLE STATEMENTS, WHETHER HE HAD ANY TEXTS OF SUCH STATEMENT. IF SO, HE WOULD BE QUITE WILLING TO LOOK AT THEM. HE AGREED WITH THE HUNGARIAN REP THAT THINGS WERE IN A STAGE WHERE THE EASTERN REPS WERE HEARING ALLIED STATEMENTS THAT FIRST SOUNDED ONE WAY, BUT SOUNDED ANOTHER WAY ON LATER REPETITION. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ALLIES WERE MORE  
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HOW TO PROVIDE FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT HUNGARY WOULD BE WILLING TO JOIN IN FUTURE MEASURES RELATED TO FUTURE REDUCTIONS. IT WAS NOT THE ALLIED IDEA TO CREATE A THIRD CATEGORY OF STATES, BUT SIMPLY TO STATE IN SOME AGREED PARAGRAPH OF THE PROCEDURES PAPER THAT THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION WAS OPEN.

15. HUNGARIAN REP SAID THAT IF THERE WERE NOT TO BE THREE CATEGORIES, THEN THERE WOULD BE TWO, AND IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO AGREE ON A STATEMENT THAT THE GROUP OF 11 CAN INVITE OTHER STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN ELABORATING CERTAIN MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THE INVITED STATE. HE BELIEVED THIS COULD BE THE BASIS FOR A COMMON STATEMENT. THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS SOLUTION, WHICH WOULD BE AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION FOR THE WESTERN POWERS AND A

GENUINELY NEUTRAL ONE. KHLESTOV SAID NO THREE CATEGORIES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THIS WAS VERY CLEAR. THERE COULD BE TWO CATEGORIES ONLY. THE EASTERN UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT HUNGARY WAS AMONG

THE 8. US REP SAID IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE PREFERRED EASTERN SO-  
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LUTION OF LISTING HUNGARY AMONG THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT A NEUTRAL SOLUTION. THE ALLIED REPS WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE POTENTIAL CONTENT OF STATEMENTS MENTIONED BY THE NETHERLANDS, HUNGARIAN AND SOVIET REPS, BUT IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO DISCUSS WHERE SUCH POSSIBLE STATEMENTS MIGHT APPEAR IN THE PROCEDURES

TEXT. AS THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD POINTED OUT, IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON A SINGLE STATEMENT TO WHICH ALL PARTIES WOULD SUBSCRIBE, ONE STATEMENT WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE TWO COMPLEMENTARY STATEMENTS, ONE FROM THE EAST AND ONE FROM THE WEST.

16. US REP SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO FOLLOW UP IN ONE OF TWO WAYS ON AMBASSADOR USTOR'S SUGGESTION TO INCLUDE A NEUTRALLY WORD-  
ED PARAGRAPH ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDING OTHER STATES. NEITHER OF THESE WAYS WOULD INVOLVE LISTING HUNGARY AMONG EITHER THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OR THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS. THE FIRST OF THESE WOULD BE TO SPECIFY HUNGARY IN THE PARAGRAPH CONCERNED SSATING THAT HUNGARY COULD BE ADDED TO THE FIRST LIST UNDER CERTAIN CLEAR CONDITIONS. THE SECOND WAY WOULD BE TO HAVE A LIST OF 19, A LIST OF 11, AND A LIST OF 7 AND TO ADD A PARAGRAPH WHICH SUGGESTED THAT OTHER STATES MIGHT BE ADDED TO THE FIRST GROUP.

17. KVITSINSKIY SAID THIS WOULD BE THE SAME THING AS PUTTING HUNGARY IN AS A 12 TH MEMBER OF THE LIST OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. WE HAD TO GO BACK TO PUTTING HUNGARY IN THE CATEGORY OF THE 8. IT WAS SIFFICULT TO FOLLOW WESTERN REASONING. THE WEST WANTED TO LEAVE SOMETHING OPEN AND PREJUDICED FOR THE FUTURE. WHY LEAVE THE QUESTION OPEN? WHY SPECIFY HUNGARY? TO DO SO WAS TANTAMOUNT TO MAKING HUNGARY A DIRECT PARTICIPANT. IF THE ALLIES WISHED, THEY COULD MADE A STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT SHOULD NOT TRY TO MOVE HUNGARY OUT OF THE CATEGORY OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS.

18. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV SAID WE SHOULD GO BACK TO THE BEGINNING. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THE ALLIES WERE GOING BACKWARDS INTO THE PAST AND THAT THE WSTERN DELEGATES WERE ONCE AGAIN PRESENTING THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS. JUDGING FROM THESE REMARKS AND ALSO FROM HIS CONVERSATIONS ON THE PREVIOUS EVEING WITH UK AND FRG REPS, IT SEEMED TO BE AN UNFORTUNATE FACT THAT THE WESTERN ALLIES DID NOT CORRECTLY UNDERSTAND THE EASTERN POSITION. THE EASTERN POSITION

WAS THAT HUNGARY WAS NOT IN THE CATEGORY OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS,  
OR THAT IF HUNGARY WERE IN, ITALY WAS IN. THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD  
SAID ITALY WAS OUT. THIS WAS THE WESTERN POSITION, NOT THE EAST-  
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ERN ONE, AND THE EASTERN POSITION HAD TO BE TAKEN FULLY INTO AC-  
COUNT IN TRYING TO REACH ANY SOLUTION. THE EAST WANTED HUNGARY  
OUT, THE WEST WANTED HUNGARY IN OR TO LEAVE THE QUESTION OPEN FOR  
THE FUTURE, WHICH IN THE PRESENT WESTERN VERSION WAS THE SAME  
THING. THE NETHERLANDS REP'S ACCOUNT OF HIS REMARKS AND THOSE OF  
HUNGARIAN REP WAS INACCURATE. WE WERE NOW DISCUSSING A NEUTRAL  
AND OBJECTIVE SOLUTION. THIS MEANT HUNGARY COULD NOT BE AMONG  
THE 11 AND THIS IN TURN MEANT HUNGARY HAD TO BE LISTED AMONG THE 8.

19. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, IF THE ALLIES WANTED TO MAKE SOME  
ACCOMPANYING DECLARATION WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM THE RIGHT TO RAISE  
THE ISSUE OF INCREASING THE GROUP IN THE FUTURE, THIS WOULD BE  
POSSIBLE. OR, THIS CONCEPT COULD BE HANDLED IN A MORE GENERAL WAY,  
TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT. ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN VIEW, THEY  
THOUGHT THAT HUNGARY SHOULD MAKE SOME ANSWER TOO.

20. OR POSSIBLY THE EASTERN STATES SHOULD REPLY TOGETHER. WE  
MIGHT LOOK AT SUCH TEXTS, BUT IF HUNGARY MADE SOME DECLARATION,  
THEN ITALY SHOULD. HE BELIEVED THAT THE ALLIES WERE TAKING ONLY  
THEIR OWN POSITION INTO ACCOUNT. THEY DESIRED TO INCLUDE HUNGARY  
IN THE GROUP OF DECISION-MAKERS EITHER NOW OR PERHAPS AT THE BEGIN-  
NING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WERE EXCLUDING  
ITALY. IT WOULD BE MORE NEUTRAL TO PLACE HUNGARY AND ITALY IN A  
DEFINITE STATUS OF OBSERVERS, AND TO HAVE BOTH MAKE A STATEMENT  
RESERVING THEIR POSITIONS FOR A LATER POINT. KHLESTOV SAID  
THERE HAD TO BE SOME MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS. THE  
ALLIES WERE SETTING FORTH THE NATO POSITION AND SAYING IT WAS AN  
ENORMOUS CONCESSION. PERHAPS SO, BUT IT WAS NOT A POSITION WHICH  
TOOK INTO A REALISTIC

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ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES. IF A RESOLUTION WERE TO BE FOUND, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A MIDDLE ROAD. IT WAS NOT A MIDDLE ROAD TO MENTION HUNGARY. IF HUNGARY WERE MENTIONED, ITALY WOULD HAVE TO BE MENTIONED. IF THE EASTERN POSITION WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, EITHER HUNGARY WOULD BE IN THE 8, TOGETHER WITH ITALY, OR BOTH WOULD NOT BE IN THE 8. IF THE ALLIES WANTED SOME DECLARATION FROM HUNGARY ON HUNGARY, THEN THERE SHOULD BE A DECLARATION FROM ITALY ON ITALY. OTHERWISE, NEITHER SHOULD BE MENTIONED, BUT BOTH PUT IN THE GROUP OF 8. IF THIS WERE DONE, THEN ONE COULD DISCUSS AN OBJECTIVE FORMULA FOR ENLARGEMENT IN A WAY WHICH DOES NOT INJURE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE.

21. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME REMARKS BY SOME WESTERN DELEGATES SAYING IT WAS THE CONFIDENTIAL

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WESTERN INTENTION TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY AT A LATER STAGE WHEN THE WEST CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL. HE APPRECIATED THIS MIGHT BE IMPORTANT FOR THE ALLIES. THE ALLIED REPS SHOULD PLEASE INDICATE WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND IN THIS REGARD. SOME REAL PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE IN THIS DIRECTION.

22. THE NETHERLANDS REP RECALLED TO THE EASTERN



REPS THAT HE HAD POINTED OUT ON PREVIOUS OCCASION THAT A COOPTION FORMULA MIGHT APPLY TO A WIDER GROUP THAN THE ALLIES WOULD BE INTERESTED IN, OR PLACE PRESSURE ON SPECIFIC COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE AS DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHO WOULD NOT WISH TO. SUCH AN APPROACH WAS OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF THE ISSUE WE WERE TRYING TO DEAL WITH AT THIS TIME.

23. US REP SAID PRESENT STATUS WAS THAT THE EAST DID NOT WANT TO MENTION OF HUNGARY IN A CATEGORY OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND WEST DID NOT WANT TO MENTION IT IN CATEGORY OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS. HENCE, SOME NEUTRAL FORMULA SHOULD BE FOUND, WHICH LEFT OPEN TO POSSIBILITY OF ITS JOINING ONE CATEGORY OR THE OTHER AT A LATER STAGE. KVITSINSKIY SAID THE SOVIETS COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS APPROACH.

24. KHLESTOV SAID THAT IF HE UNDERSTOOD IT CORRECTLY, THE ALLIES WISHED TO INSURE THAT THEIR RIGHT TO RAISE THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION WAS NOT PREJUDICED IF, DURING THE LATER COURSE OF THE PRESENT TALKS OR NEGOTIATIONS, SOMETHING EMERGED WHICH MIGHT SUGGEST A LIMITATION ON THE ALLIED POSSIBILITY OF RAISING THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE IN THE FUTURE. IF THIS WERE THE PROBLEM WE SHOULD ALL SEEK SOME COMMON SOLUTION.

25. US REP SAID THIS WAS ONLY A FRAGMENT OF THE PROBLEM. HE REFERRED TO THE OPENING STATEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS REP TO THE EFFECT THAT THE STATUS OF HUNGARY SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN FOR LATER DECISION. THE ALLIES WISHED TO KEEP THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF HUNGARY AND ITS PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE DECISIONS AND POSSIBLE AGREED MEASURES OPEN IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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OBJECTIVE SENSE AND NOT MERELY HAVE THE RIGHT TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION.

26. USTOR SAID IT MIGHT BE A MATTER OF YEARS BEFORE A STAGE WAS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHERE THE QUESTION OF DIRECT HUNGARIAN INVOLVEMENT MIGHT BECOME TOPICAL. IN THE MEANWHILE, THE QUESTION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF HUNGARY AS A PARTICIPANT MUST BE RESOLVED. THERE SHOULD BE NO SPECIAL STATUS FOR HUNGARY. IF THERE WERE A GROUP OF 11 AND 8, THE LATTER INCLUDING HUNGARY, THIS WOULD CONFIRM THE REALITIES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.

27. US REP SAID THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN IN THE OBJECTIVE SENSE, WITH REGARD TO THE STATUS OF HUNGARY IN THE PRESENT TALKS, HE HAD ALREADY POINTED OUT THAT HUNGARY COULD ENJOY ALL OF THOSE RIGHTS OF A DIRECT PARTICIPANT WHICH IT WISHED TO UTILIZE. HOW MANY OF THESE RIGHTS IT WISHED TO UTILIZE WAS ITS OWN AFFAIR.

28. KHLESTOV SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE WESTERN POSITION WAS THAT ALLIES WISH TO INCLUDE HUNGARY AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THEY WANTED TO LEAVE HUNGARY ON THE HOOK SO THAT THEY COULD PULL IT INTO THE STATU ZVRCBYZCT PARTICIPANTS LATER ON, WHENEVER THEY WISHED. THE EASTERN SIDE DID NOT AGREE WITH THIS IDEA, IT WAS UNPRODUCTIVE. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT THE ALLIES MEANT BY THE CONCEPT OF LEAVING THE QUESTION OPEN WAS THAT THEY THEMSELVES WISHED TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO RAISE THE ISSUE, BEARING IN MIND THAT HUNGARY, AND ITALY WERE LINKED, THIS WOULD BE A MORE PRODUCTIVE POSSIBILITY. THE SITUATION WAS INDEED COMPLICATED. IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND PRACTICABLE WAYS TO SOLVE IT, BUT THESE SHOULD BE REALISTIC ONES WHICH TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWPOINTS OF BOTH SIDES. KHLESTOV ASKED WHY ITALY COULD NOT SAY SOMETHING IN SUCH AN EXCHANGE.

29. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE REASON WAS SIMPLE. ITALY WAS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT AND UNDISPUTABLY SO. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE ALLIES NATURALLY HAD SECURITY INTERESTS AS REGARDS HUNGARY IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR. THEY HAD BEEN TRYING TO DEAL WITH THESE INTERESTS IN NEUTRAL AND NON- PREJUDICIALWAY AND TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY TO DEAL WITH THEM EFFECTIVELY AT A CONFIDENTIAL

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LATER STAGE. THE SOVIET CONCEPTS OF PLACING HUNGARY IN A SPECIAL STATUS WOULD NOT BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR DISCUSSION OF SECURITY ISSUES. THERE COULD BE NO ADDITION OF

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ITALY TO THE GROUP. THIS WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE MATTERS NEEDLESSLY. UNFORTUNATELY, THUS FAR IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE, ALLIED REPS HAD NOT HEARD MANY REMARKS FROM THE EAST WHICH INDICATED ANY ADVANCE ON ITS PART. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ALLIES HAD DROPPED THEIR EARLIER INSISTENCE THAT HUNGARY MUST BE IN FROM THE OUTSET. THE ISSUE WAS A PRACTICAL ONE, HUNGARY MIGHT CHANGE ITS MIND IN THE FUTURE AND FOR SOME REASON CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT IT PARTICIPATE AT SOME POINT ON MATTERS UNDER DISCUSSION, WHEN THEY DESIRED TO DO THIS, OR WAS INVITED TO DO SO IN ORDER TO MAKE A POSSIBLE REDUCTION AGREEMENT COMPLETE. THE ALLIES WANTED NOT ONLY THE RIGHT TO RAISE SUCH ISSUES BUT THE CAPACITY OF DOING SO EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT LIMITATIONS OR PREJUDICE TO THIS FROM THE STATUS ASSIGNED TO HUNGARY. THE ALLIES COULD NOT ACCEPT PLACING HUNGARY IN THE CATEGORY OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS WITH ONLY A VAGUE DECLARATION THAT THEY COULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY AT SOME FUTURE POINT. BUT IF THE EASTERN REPS WOULD ADVANCE FURTHER WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE SECURITY ISSUE, SUCH A STATEMENT COULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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LOOKED AT. PERHAPS THE TWO POSITIONS WERE NOT SO FAR APART AS INDICATED; PERHAPS SOME WORDING COULD BE FOUND.

30. HUNGARIAN REP AGAIN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ENLARGEMENT FURMULA. HIS VIEW WAS THAT SINCE HUNGARY WAS NOT IN THE GROUP OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THIS MEANT AUTOMATICALLY THAT HUNGARY WAS IN THE GROUP OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS. THERE COULD BE INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS BY THE WESTERN POWERS OR BY HUNGARY WHICH

WOULD COVER THE IDEA THAT THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY'S PARTICIPATION WAS IN ABEYANCE FOR THE FUTURE. IN PRACTICE, THE ISSUE OF HUNGARY'S PARTICIPATION MIGHT NOT COME UP FOR A LONG TIME AND WHEN IT DID ONE MIGHT COME TO BOTH HUNGARY AND ITALY AT A LATER STAGE. WE SHOULD START WITH 11 PARTICIPANTS, 8 OBSERVER, LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHERS MAY BE TAKEN IN WHEN THE 11 REACHED THE DECISION ON THIS. IT WAS A QUESTION OF HOW TO PUT THIS FORMULA ON PAPER, HOW TO PHRASE IT.

31. THE US REP SAID THE HUNGARIAN PROPOSAL WAS UNEQUITABLE, EXCEPT IN THE WAY HE HIMSELF EARLIER HAD SUGGESTED IT BE AMENDED BECAUSE IT ENVISAGED HUNGARY IN THE CATEGORY OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS.

32. KHLESTOV RESPONDED TO NETHERLANDS REP'S MENTION OF THE DESIGNATION FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AT THE OUTSET OF THE SESSION. HE SAID THIS DESIGNATION SHOULD BE BASED ON LEGAL DOCUMENTS AND TREATIES SUCH AS THE TREATIES SIGNED BY THE FRG AMBASSADOR IN VIENNA FOR "THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY." GERMANY WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE UN SO THE PRACTICE THERE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED. WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE PRACTICE OF UNESCO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. IN HELSINKI, THE FRENCH ALPHABET WAS IN USE.

33. THE NETHERLANDS REP POINTED OUT THAT IN HELSINKI, GERMANY WAS LISTED AS "ALLEMAGNE, REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'". HE POINTED OUT THAT STANDARD UN PRACTICE ON THE SUBJECT WAS TO LIST THE FRG UNDER GERMANY. US REP POINTED OUT THAT MOST COUNTRIES WERE LISTED UNDER GEOGRAPHIC DESIGNATORS AND THAT THERE WERE RELATIVELY FEW EXCEPTIONS.

34. THE QUESTION OF THE NEXT MEETING WAS RAISED. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE THE DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING OPEN UNTIL THE EARLY DAYS OF NEXT WEEK AND THAT THE PRECISE DATE COULD BE DETERMINED LATER. THE HUNGARIAN REP SUGGESTED MARCH 27. KHLESTOV  
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REPLIED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MEET THEN OR THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE MARCH 27 DATE WAS TENTATIVELY ACCEPTED, SUBJECT TO LATER CONFIRMATION. HUMES

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
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**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
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MBFR CAPITALS 281  
SALT TALKS  
SECSTATE WASHDC  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH  
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